From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Lucio De Re To: 9fans@cse.psu.edu Subject: Re: [9fans] secstore Message-ID: <20020515141630.O1584@cackle.proxima.alt.za> References: <80dc9d46780953d37104e05c11fbed0f@9fs.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <80dc9d46780953d37104e05c11fbed0f@9fs.org>; from nigel@9fs.org on Wed, May 15, 2002 at 12:58:16PM +0100 Date: Wed, 15 May 2002 14:16:31 +0200 Topicbox-Message-UUID: 9295cf94-eaca-11e9-9e20-41e7f4b1d025 On Wed, May 15, 2002 at 12:58:16PM +0100, nigel@9fs.org wrote: > > So a suitable solution for a combined cpu/auth server would be to use > kfs and bind it over /adm/secstore for the secstored process only? > I doubt it. It smacks of "security by obscurity" as other users on the CPU server would be able to mount it too. I think that, like Kerberos, the auth server ought to be a physically secured unit. Of course, you may not need such paranoia, but in a technical sense at least, that would be mandatory. ++L