From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
Message-ID: <62c26e89073f7a99463c42198cf6dd62@terzarima.net>
To: 9fans@cse.psu.edu
Subject: Re: [9fans] secstore security
From: Charles Forsyth <forsyth@terzarima.net>
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 11:23:44 +0100
In-Reply-To: <20050411100113.GC56515@smp500.sitetronics.com>
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i think the question was really about security of
the server not the protocol or client use.
can anyone with access to the secstore
files on the secstore machine, specifically its administrator,
do a dictionary attack on those files?

yes.

if i log in to my secstore as the owner of the secstore files,
i can see the file factotum, and run auth/aescbc -d to decrypt it.
of course, i know my own password in this case, but that answers
the question about the file.

it just emphasises the general importance of choosing (or generating)
good  encryptiono keys.   of course, since the server just stores files as  provided
by the client, there is nothing to stop the client making the scheme
more elaborate than currently is done for the file `factotum',
and the client could easily use a fancy scheme to generate and recover
a `password', since it never leaves the client.
in short, the security is ultimately limited by client choice,
and that choice is not itself limited by the server or protocol.