From: Anthony Martin <ality@pbrane.org>
To: 9front@9front.org
Subject: Re: [9front] [PATCH] libsec: add minimal support for the tls renegotiation extension
Date: Sat, 21 Jan 2023 23:55:40 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y8zr/AKMunBzF1YM@alice> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFSF3XNwVSnV6ixXVOdzQthkEZgUM48uN_X8NYAQ6v=d69FUCw@mail.gmail.com>
hiro <23hiro@gmail.com> once said:
> No, you're right, I just wonder what kept the openssl people from
> fixing this problem on their side? Since we have unsafe renegotiations
> disabled, we're doing the right and safe thing. so why can't they deal
> with it?
We never supported renegotiation, meaning after the initial
handshake we never send client or server hello messages and
the record layer (tls(3)) ends the connection if it receives
any handshake records after the data file is open.
But that doesn't mean the other side (e.g. OpenSSL) knows we
won't initiate a renegotiation. There is no indication in the
original protocol. Without implementing any of the mechanisms
in RFC 5746, there's no way to know a renegotiation will be
secure if it happens. The connection could be under attack.
RFC 5746 is called the "Renegotiation Indication" extension.
Does that make sense?
Cheers,
Anthony
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-22 7:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-10 2:24 Anthony Martin
2023-01-18 15:07 ` [9front] " Anthony Martin
2023-01-19 4:30 ` [9front] " ori
2023-01-19 4:48 ` ori
2022-11-10 2:24 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-28 21:20 ` ori
2023-01-28 21:59 ` cinap_lenrek
2023-01-19 9:50 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-20 12:12 ` hiro
2023-01-20 21:05 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-20 22:33 ` hiro
2023-01-21 3:48 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-21 12:54 ` hiro
2023-01-21 17:29 ` Steve Simon
2023-01-22 16:00 ` hiro
2023-01-22 7:55 ` Anthony Martin [this message]
2023-01-22 16:10 ` hiro
2023-01-23 11:18 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-23 13:16 ` hiro
2023-01-23 14:24 ` Ori Bernstein
2023-01-23 14:29 ` Ori Bernstein
2023-01-24 0:14 ` hiro
2023-01-24 0:16 ` hiro
2023-01-25 16:19 ` kemal
2023-01-25 16:39 ` hiro
2023-01-25 17:07 ` kemal
2023-01-25 17:18 ` hiro
2023-01-25 17:30 ` kemal
2023-01-25 17:36 ` kemal
2023-01-26 20:54 ` hiro
2023-01-26 21:52 ` Frank D. Engel, Jr.
2023-01-27 6:11 ` kemal
2023-01-27 10:55 ` hiro
2023-01-27 17:38 ` kemal
2023-01-23 16:23 ` hiro
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