From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: <9front-bounces@9front.inri.net> X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on inbox.vuxu.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=5.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,UNPARSEABLE_RELAY autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 Received: from 9front.inri.net (9front.inri.net [168.235.81.73]) by inbox.vuxu.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C9BD4264A9 for ; Thu, 16 May 2024 03:41:12 +0200 (CEST) Received: from wopr.sciops.net ([216.126.196.60]) by 9front; Wed May 15 21:39:56 -0400 2024 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sciops.net; s=20210706; t=1715823558; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=talxDZb5IBnj69siQ9eXOb8ReVId/QZHjao32WT3jkk=; b=TO8WiSImfRC5ioVEhlYR24CATv9FuIYtdom5jQgunP7LNF5RbBQsrD4N8+BKOBZe8etqDo TZH70nRxfRqvZdHpiJS/bExpaPAAl45NeYYEzVKGpmLL3nyaM9UglkITY6D5RiXv+3012b 9fiAXGZG+WXf+sYcSZgUjRko3DtrRXo= Received: from localhost (wopr.sciops.net [local]) by wopr.sciops.net (OpenSMTPD) with ESMTPA id 802facee for <9front@9front.org>; Wed, 15 May 2024 18:39:18 -0700 (PDT) Date: Wed, 15 May 2024 18:39:18 -0700 From: Kurt H Maier To: 9front@9front.org Message-ID: Mail-Followup-To: 9front@9front.org References: <4C1B6B746BF77B2F88319BBFCBFEB08C@driusan.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: List-ID: <9front.9front.org> List-Help: X-Glyph: ➈ X-Bullshit: content-addressed private dependency browser metadata-oriented layer Subject: Re: [9front] Re: "Insecure" icon in gmail Reply-To: 9front@9front.org Precedence: bulk On Wed, May 15, 2024 at 06:23:05PM -0700, Anthony Martin wrote: > > Not currently. Note that webfs, ftpfs, aux/wpa, dns over tls, and > probably others do not bother checking the validity of a server's > certificate. This is not ideal. No one has done the work. Alas. > I'm not sure how much benefit there is to cert validation, since the current Browser/CA forum is just "whatever Google wants" and there's only meaningful enforcement against bad CAs about once per decade. TOFU is as good as anything else, since there's nobody trustworthy to whom to outsource any of this. As should have been obvious to the internet forefathers, conflating integrity, authorization, and authentication turns out to be a bad idea. Consider TLS to be opportunistic line encryption; if you want to secure the contents of the messages, sign or encrypt them, and get your public keys to the recipient on some other channel. khm