From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 X-Msuck: nntp://news.gmane.io/gmane.science.mathematics.categories/6354 Path: news.gmane.org!not-for-mail From: Posina Venkata Rayudu Newsgroups: gmane.science.mathematics.categories Subject: concept & truth-value Date: Wed, 03 Nov 2010 06:31:04 -0700 Message-ID: References: Reply-To: Posina Venkata Rayudu NNTP-Posting-Host: lo.gmane.org Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Trace: dough.gmane.org 1288800009 897 80.91.229.12 (3 Nov 2010 16:00:09 GMT) X-Complaints-To: usenet@dough.gmane.org NNTP-Posting-Date: Wed, 3 Nov 2010 16:00:09 +0000 (UTC) To: categories Original-X-From: majordomo@mlist.mta.ca Wed Nov 03 17:00:05 2010 Return-path: Envelope-to: gsmc-categories@m.gmane.org Original-Received: from smtpx.mta.ca ([138.73.1.114]) by lo.gmane.org with esmtp (Exim 4.69) (envelope-from ) id 1PDfkq-0003wX-Qe for gsmc-categories@m.gmane.org; Wed, 03 Nov 2010 17:00:04 +0100 Original-Received: from mlist.mta.ca ([138.73.1.63]:50628) by smtpx.mta.ca with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1PDfk8-00036e-VE; Wed, 03 Nov 2010 12:59:20 -0300 Original-Received: from majordomo by mlist.mta.ca with local (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1PDfk6-0005QD-3I for categories-list@mlist.mta.ca; Wed, 03 Nov 2010 12:59:18 -0300 In-Reply-To: Precedence: bulk Xref: news.gmane.org gmane.science.mathematics.categories:6354 Archived-At: Dear All, Sentences, which are put together from words embodying concepts [according to the laws of Grammar], can be true or false, but parts of sentences i.e. words (e.g. of) can not be assigned a truth-value. I'd appreciate very much any clarification or explanation of the above observation, which many of you may also have made and thought about it and worked on it. I thought of sending this questions to catlist in part because I found that similar observations are often made by those working in category theory and those working in cognitive science. For example, Prof. Lawvere in his 'Foundations and Applications' paper points out that it is 'incorrect to think that concepts can be adequately characterized in terms of properties alone.' As if echoing Lawvere, Smith and Medin also draw our attention to the empirical finding that 'just listing properties does not completely specify the knowledge represented in a concept. People also know about the relations between the properties.' Lawvere, F. W. (2003). Foundation and Applications: Axiomatization and Education. The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9, p. 220. Smith, E. E., and Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 83. Thanking you, Sincerely yours, posina [For admin and other information see: http://www.mta.ca/~cat-dist/ ]