From: john at keeping.me.uk (John Keeping)
Subject: Bash vulnerability (CVE-2014-6271)
Date: Wed, 24 Sep 2014 20:27:20 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140924192719.GA2555@serenity> (raw)
In case anyone hasn't seen it yet, today's Bash vulnerability
(CVE-2014-6271) [0] may affect CGit servers.
I don't believe CGit in its default configuration will cause a shell to
be executed, but if you configure a filter then you may well be causing
a shell to be executed with the environment of the cgit process, which
will include user-specified variables such as the HTTP User-Agent
header.
The example syntax-highlighting.sh, about-formatting.sh and
commit-links.sh are vulnerable if /bin/sh on your system is a vulnerable
version of Bash.
I confirmed that I can echo arbitrary content from the User-Agent header
into the response on a CGit server I run which has custom filters
installed.
[0] http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q3/650
reply other threads:[~2014-09-24 19:27 UTC|newest]
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