From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: normalperson at yhbt.net (Eric Wong) Date: Tue, 23 Feb 2016 06:21:22 +0000 Subject: Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning In-Reply-To: References: <20160223011957.GA788@dcvr.yhbt.net> Message-ID: <20160223062122.GA4438@dcvr.yhbt.net> "Jason A. Donenfeld" wrote: > On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:19 AM, Eric Wong wrote: > > git already has plenty of integrity checking built-in and > > getting the proper hashes for the heads/tags over a > > trusted-enough medium is enough (or reading the fine code). > > No, git's built-in integrity protection really is not sufficient if > the transport is compromised. git commits, tags, and request-pull-formatted emails (with unabbreviated commit IDs) may all be signed with GPG. Once those are verified, "git fsck" results can be trusted. > > And as others have said, HTTPS isn't impenetrable > > I'd like some specific details on this repeated claim. The known problem would be CAs being compromised. I've also heard of MITM stripping proxies; but don't know much about them. > > the CA system is still a major problem. > > True. But there doesn't appear to be a widely deployed alternative. GPG-signed tags/commits/emails. Probably not as widely deployed as TLS CAs, but probably sufficient in Free Software circles. > > Also, TLS libraries can introduce new bugs and vulnerabilities > > like Heartbleed. > > This is true, but I already require a public TLS deployment, so it's > there regardless. Vulnerabilities may affect clients, too (for example, the recent OpenSSH roaming vulnerability). IMHO, users should be given a choice of which poison to pick. Disclaimer: Personally, I don't GPG sign anything, myself, either. For selfish reasons, I do not want people to trust me or my signature and would prefer they read and scrutinize what little I write. And we can't rule out undiscovered vulnerabilties affecting GPG, either.