Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

Hello projects-with-mailing-lists,

Now that git.zx2c4.com runs over HTTPS, I'm considering getting rid of
the plaintext git:// endpoint for cloning.

This means:

git clone git://git.zx2c4.com/cgit
-->
git clone https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit

git clone git://git.zx2c4.com/password-store
-->
git clone https://git.zx2c4.com/password-store


Does anybody have any objections or comments?

Thanks,
Jason

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

Well, uh oh speghettio!

Looks like somebody has published in paper the git:// URI:

https://books.google.fr/books?id=kJsQAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA314&lpg=PA314&dq=git://git.zx2c4.com&source=bl&ots=W6M9TlYzCY&sig=g-PY0glN2ddWygtFDLiHgbiC69I&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=git%3A%2F%2Fgit.zx2c4.com&f=false

Perhaps there's a way to write a dummy daemon that prints a message...

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[mailings]

On 22/02/16 19:16, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Hello projects-with-mailing-lists,
>
> Now that git.zx2c4.com runs over HTTPS, I'm considering getting rid of
> the plaintext git:// endpoint for cloning.
>
> This means:
>
> git clone git://git.zx2c4.com/cgit
> -->
> git clone https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit
>
> git clone git://git.zx2c4.com/password-store
> -->
> git clone https://git.zx2c4.com/password-store
>
>
> Does anybody have any objections or comments?
>

Yes, why?
What's the point?

The repos are public, so cloning them over https bring nothing, except 
extra overhead and server load.


> Thanks,
> Jason
> _______________________________________________
> CGit mailing list
> CGit at lists.zx2c4.com
> http://lists.zx2c4.com/mailman/listinfo/cgit
>

-- 
Ferry Huberts

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 8:18 PM, Ferry Huberts <mailings at hupie.com> wrote:
> Yes, why?
> What's the point?

So that the contents of the repository cannot be modified in transit.

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[normalperson]

"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason at zx2c4.com> wrote:
> Now that git.zx2c4.com runs over HTTPS, I'm considering getting rid of
> the plaintext git:// endpoint for cloning.

> Does anybody have any objections or comments?

I suggest keeping git:// running as automated mirrors may not be
monitored very closely or easily updated.

git already has plenty of integrity checking built-in and
getting the proper hashes for the heads/tags over a
trusted-enough medium is enough (or reading the fine code).

And as others have said, HTTPS isn't impenetrable and the
CA system is still a major problem.

Also, TLS libraries can introduce new bugs and vulnerabilities
like Heartbleed.  Quoting from http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html

|  By turning on TLS support in Postfix, you not only get the
|  ability to encrypt mail and to authenticate remote SMTP clients
|  or servers. You also turn on thousands and thousands of lines of
|  OpenSSL library code. Assuming that OpenSSL is written as
|  carefully as Wietse's own code, every 1000 lines introduce one
|  additional bug into Postfix.

Something to keep in mind :)

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

https://git.zx2c4.com/git-daemon-dummy/about/

I just wrote this.

Will consider whether or not to deploy it.

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:19 AM, Eric Wong <normalperson at yhbt.net> wrote:
> I suggest keeping git:// running as automated mirrors may not be
> monitored very closely or easily updated.

That's a good point. I'd forgotten about automated mirrors. I'll keep
logs of the git:// pulls for a month or so and see if there are any
regular pullers and also if I can track down the source IP. Perhaps
it's a manageable pool of people to switch over.

> git already has plenty of integrity checking built-in and
> getting the proper hashes for the heads/tags over a
> trusted-enough medium is enough (or reading the fine code).

No, git's built-in integrity protection really is not sufficient if
the transport is compromised.

> And as others have said, HTTPS isn't impenetrable

I'd like some specific details on this repeated claim.

> the CA system is still a major problem.

True. But there doesn't appear to be a widely deployed alternative.

> Also, TLS libraries can introduce new bugs and vulnerabilities
> like Heartbleed.

This is true, but I already require a public TLS deployment, so it's
there regardless.

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[normalperson]

"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason at zx2c4.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:19 AM, Eric Wong <normalperson at yhbt.net> wrote:
> > git already has plenty of integrity checking built-in and
> > getting the proper hashes for the heads/tags over a
> > trusted-enough medium is enough (or reading the fine code).
> 
> No, git's built-in integrity protection really is not sufficient if
> the transport is compromised.

git commits, tags, and request-pull-formatted emails (with
unabbreviated commit IDs) may all be signed with GPG.

Once those are verified, "git fsck" results can be trusted.

> > And as others have said, HTTPS isn't impenetrable
> 
> I'd like some specific details on this repeated claim.

The known problem would be CAs being compromised.
I've also heard of MITM stripping proxies; but don't know
much about them.

> > the CA system is still a major problem.
> 
> True. But there doesn't appear to be a widely deployed alternative.

GPG-signed tags/commits/emails.  Probably not as widely deployed
as TLS CAs, but probably sufficient in Free Software circles.

> > Also, TLS libraries can introduce new bugs and vulnerabilities
> > like Heartbleed.
> 
> This is true, but I already require a public TLS deployment, so it's
> there regardless.

Vulnerabilities may affect clients, too (for example, the recent
OpenSSH roaming vulnerability).  IMHO, users should be given a
choice of which poison to pick.



Disclaimer: Personally, I don't GPG sign anything, myself,
either.  For selfish reasons, I do not want people to trust me
or my signature and would prefer they read and scrutinize
what little I write.  And we can't rule out undiscovered
vulnerabilties affecting GPG, either.

[pass] Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 2:53 PM, Brian Minton <brian at minton.name> wrote:
> Certainly got can sign individual tags with an OpenPGP key. Each commit is
> also hashed and the hashes are known. If you sign every commit, or at least
> every release, the code can't be tampered with. This is the workflow of, for
> instance, the Linux kernel.

False. Commits in Linux development are not routinely signed.

[pass] Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

Yes, releases are. Obviously this conversation extends to much more
than releases, though. I sign tags too:
https://git.zx2c4.com/cgit/tag/?h=v0.12

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[hacking]

On 02/22/2016 07:16 PM, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Does anybody have any objections or comments?

git:// should be removed from clone urls

Cheers
Daniel

Killing plaintext git:// in favor of https:// cloning

[Jason]

Welp, in the last 2 days:

krantz log # grep git-daemon messages | grep 'Connection from' | wc -l
3079

So, I guess git:// will be sticking around, alas.