Re: gnus-insert-mime-security-button

[Andreas Fuchs <asf@acm.org>]

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Today, Kai Großjohann <Kai.Grossjohann@CS.Uni-Dortmund.DE> wrote:
> So maybe Gnus should suppress the signed parts where the verification
> failed and print

>         FORGED CONTENT SNIPPED
> in large friendly letters, instead.

Eeeek. That would make it a little difficult to read mailing lists where
people sign their mails by default (debian-devel, for example) while
their keys are not in your keyring.

Having faces for the different possibilities (check failed, check OK but
key untrusted, check OK and key trusted) would be nice, I think (a
multi-coloured sidebar, anyone?).

Assuming that signed content for which the check fails is forged by
default would be too confusing and annoying, IMHO -- think bad MTAs and
MUAs which don't do PGP content right.

(Proof by example: is this message forged? (-:)

-- 
Andreas Fuchs, <asf@acm.org>, <d96001@htlwrn.ac.at>, antifuchs

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