From: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
To: musl@lists.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Security advisory for musl libc - stack-based buffer overflow in ipv6 literal parsing [CVE-2015-1817]
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:41:53 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150330044153.GK6817@brightrain.aerifal.cx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150330113337.430f2b0c@r2lynx>
On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:33:37AM +0700, Рысь wrote:
> On Mon, 30 Mar 2015 00:01:25 -0400
> Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> wrote:
>
> > A stack-based buffer overflow has been found in musl libc's ipv6
> > address literal parsing code. Programs which call the inet_pton or
> > getaddrinfo function with AF_INET6 or AF_UNSPEC and untrusted address
> > strings are affected. Successful exploitation yields control of the
> > return address. Having enabled stack protector at the application
> > level does not mitigate the issue. All users should patch or upgrade.
> >
> > Software: musl libc (http://www.musl-libc.org)
> >
> > Severity: high
> >
> > Affected Versions: 0.9.15 - 1.0.4, 1.1.0 - 1.1.7.
> >
> > Bug introduced in commit: 78f889153167452de4cbced921f6428b3d4f663a
> >
> > Bug fixed in commit: fc13acc3dcb5b1f215c007f583a63551f6a71363
> >
> > Patch: musl_dn_expand_overflow_fix.diff (attached) (fix+hardening)
>
> How much it affects readonly embedded systems as well? Does almost
> latest dropbear listening ssh port publicly is actually vulnerable?
I don't think so, but I haven't done analysis of specific software.
Busybox is affected if it's installed setuid and ping is enabled (a
configuration I strongly recommend not using since they don't handle
setuid securely in general) but that's limited to local attacks. I
don't think there's any way you can make dropbear (server) attempt to
parse ip literal strings remotely, but verifying this would take some
checking of the source.
Rich
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-03-30 4:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-03-30 4:01 Rich Felker
2015-03-30 4:33 ` Рысь
2015-03-30 4:41 ` Rich Felker [this message]
2015-03-30 5:18 ` Рысь
2015-04-17 13:10 Matt Johnston
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