Re: Re: fixing -fPIE + -fstack-protector-all

["Anthony G. Basile" <basile@opensource.dyc.edu>]

On 11/06/14 21:10, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On 11/06/2014 03:45 AM, Anthony G. Basile wrote:
>> On 11/05/14 10:43, Rich Felker wrote:
>>> On Wed, Nov 05, 2014 at 04:25:03PM +0100, John Spencer wrote:
>>>> using -fPIE + -fstack-protector-all is currently broken for a number
>>>> of architectures (most notably i386) in the default gcc setup
>>>> (including the musl-cross patches), as it depends on a
>>>> libssp_nonshared.a which provides __stack_chk_fail_local().
>>>
>>> As discussed on IRC, I would _like_ to be able to simply add the
>>> following to crt/i386/crti.s:
>>>
>>> __stack_chk_fail_local: hlt
>>>
>>> and equivalent for other archs. This has the added benefit of
>>> effecting a crash without going through the PLT (whereas
>>> libssp_nonshared.a's __stack_chk_fail_local calls __stack_chk_fail via
>>> the PLT) so it's not vulnerable to attacks that have overwritten the
>>> GOT with malicious pointers.
>>
>> For what its worth, hardening in gentoo (PaX kernel + userland hardening
>> with relro and bindnow) tries to prevent this kind of attack by making
>> the GOT read only after initial linking.
>
> What does the PaX kernel have to do with this?
>
> --Andy
>

Overspoke.  The userland stuff is sufficient to freeze the GOT.  I was 
just tangentially thinking of PaX's enhanced aslr.

-- 
Anthony G. Basile, Ph. D.
Chair of Information Technology
D'Youville College
Buffalo, NY 14201
(716) 829-8197