Mangled and non-mangled TUHS mail lists

[gtaylor@tnetconsulting.net (Grant Taylor)]

On 10/03/2017 08:08 AM, Steffen Nurpmeso wrote:
> It is a bit of a pity, since almost all MLs really worth reading
> use this tagging (e.g., ih, leapsecs, tz, the security lists,
> groff, as well as pcc and tinycc-devel, to name a few).

I think that modifying the subject to add a tag is a perfectly valid 
thing.  As such, provisions should make such modifications /possible/. 
Then leave the choice of doing so or not up to each list's administrator.

> And DKIM
> is no problem at all if you use G....e groups over HTTPS and give
> the business some opportunities to actually make some of the money
> necessary to drive the environment you use, HEH???

I think that GG is an option.  Just an option that I choose not to use.

I also vehemently in the option to host things yourself.  -  Email is 
not too complex that people can't successfully run their own server if 
they want to do so.

> DKIM should
> have been designed to create DKIM envelopes, so that lists could
> simply create an encapsulating DKIM layer, and all would be fine.

I believe that Mailman has an option to attach the DKIM signed message 
much like I (mis?)understand the wrapper that you're talking about.

In such case, DKIM has no say.  DKIM is designed to validate that a 
message has not been modified in source.  -  The wrapper message is a 
new message that happens to have an attachment.  Since DKIM filters are 
looking for a DKIM-Signature header in the outer most message, it does 
not matter what's in the inner / attached message.

I also staunchly believe that Mailing lists are an entity unto 
themselves.  Said entity is what sends the emails, not me.  As such, my 
opinion is that said entity should draft completely new messages using 
textual content from source material that I provided.  Thus there is 
nothing about the original message envelope to be a problem.

This also means that mailing lists could support things like subject 
modification / SPF / DKIM / DMARC / ARC / S/MIME / PGP, etc. directly.

But ... that's just me and my opinion.



-- 
Grant. . . .
unix || die

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