From: Johnnynator <Johnnynator@users.noreply.github.com>
To: ml@inbox.vuxu.org
Subject: Re: [PR PATCH] [Updated] glibc: backport patch to fix CVE-2023-4911
Date: Tue, 03 Oct 2023 22:31:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231003203127.sPOqyNQa_356lvNtYw_rJXCuiJyhFTjILoFdbP8sWtA@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <gh-mailinglist-notifications-41a7ca26-5023-4802-975b-f1789d68868e-void-packages-46415@inbox.vuxu.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 424 bytes --]
There is an updated pull request by Johnnynator against master on the void-packages repository
https://github.com/Johnnynator/void-packages CVE-2023-4911
https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/pull/46415
glibc: backport patch to fix CVE-2023-4911
https://lwn.net/ml/oss-security/20231003175031.GA16924@localhost.localdomain/
A patch file from https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/pull/46415.patch is attached
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #2: github-pr-CVE-2023-4911-46415.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-diff, Size: 8290 bytes --]
From 6b20f8066379a235cd75218a538d57fb6dce8aea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John <me@johnnynator.dev>
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:08:47 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] glibc: backport patch to fix CVE-2023-4911
https://lwn.net/ml/oss-security/20231003175031.GA16924@localhost.localdomain/
---
...te-GLIBC_TUNABLES-in-setxid-binaries.patch | 205 ++++++++++++++++++
srcpkgs/glibc/template | 2 +-
2 files changed, 206 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 srcpkgs/glibc/patches/committed-1-2-Propagate-GLIBC_TUNABLES-in-setxid-binaries.patch
diff --git a/srcpkgs/glibc/patches/committed-1-2-Propagate-GLIBC_TUNABLES-in-setxid-binaries.patch b/srcpkgs/glibc/patches/committed-1-2-Propagate-GLIBC_TUNABLES-in-setxid-binaries.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..31e1a2048eaf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/srcpkgs/glibc/patches/committed-1-2-Propagate-GLIBC_TUNABLES-in-setxid-binaries.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Subject: [committed 1/2] Propagate GLIBC_TUNABLES in setxid binaries
+Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 13:08:10 -0400
+
+GLIBC_TUNABLES scrubbing happens earlier than envvar scrubbing and some
+tunables are required to propagate past setxid boundary, like their
+env_alias. Rely on tunable scrubbing to clean out GLIBC_TUNABLES like
+before, restoring behaviour in glibc 2.37 and earlier.
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
+---
+ sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h | 1 -
+ 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
+index 81397fb90b..8278c50a84 100644
+--- a/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
++++ b/sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h
+@@ -1,16 +1,9 @@
+-#if !HAVE_TUNABLES
+-# define GLIBC_TUNABLES_ENVVAR "GLIBC_TUNABLES\0"
+-#else
+-# define GLIBC_TUNABLES_ENVVAR
+-#endif
+-
+ /* Environment variable to be removed for SUID programs. The names are
+ all stuffed in a single string which means they have to be terminated
+ with a '\0' explicitly. */
+ #define UNSECURE_ENVVARS \
+ "GCONV_PATH\0" \
+ "GETCONF_DIR\0" \
+- GLIBC_TUNABLES_ENVVAR \
+ "HOSTALIASES\0" \
+ "LD_AUDIT\0" \
+ "LD_DEBUG\0" \
+
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Subject: [committed 2/2] tunables: Terminate if end of input is reached
+ (CVE-2023-4911)
+Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 13:08:11 -0400
+
+The string parsing routine may end up writing beyond bounds of tunestr
+if the input tunable string is malformed, of the form name=name=val.
+This gets processed twice, first as name=name=val and next as name=val,
+resulting in tunestr being name=name=val:name=val, thus overflowing
+tunestr.
+
+Terminate the parsing loop at the first instance itself so that tunestr
+does not overflow.
+
+This also fixes up tst-env-setuid-tunables to actually handle failures
+correct and add new tests to validate the fix for this CVE.
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
+---
+ NEWS | 5 +++++
+ elf/dl-tunables.c | 17 +++++++++-------
+ elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
+index a94650da64..cc4b81f0ac 100644
+--- a/NEWS
++++ b/NEWS
+@@ -64,6 +64,11 @@ Security related changes:
+ an application calls getaddrinfo for AF_INET6 with AI_CANONNAME,
+ AI_ALL and AI_V4MAPPED flags set.
+
++ CVE-2023-4911: If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the
++ environment of a setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a
++ buffer overflow, which could be exploited to achieve escalated
++ privileges. This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.34.
++
+ The following bugs are resolved with this release:
+
+ [The release manager will add the list generated by
+diff --git a/elf/dl-tunables.c b/elf/dl-tunables.c
+index 62b7332d95..cae67efa0a 100644
+--- a/elf/dl-tunables.c
++++ b/elf/dl-tunables.c
+@@ -180,11 +180,7 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *valstring)
+ /* If we reach the end of the string before getting a valid name-value
+ pair, bail out. */
+ if (p[len] == '\0')
+- {
+- if (__libc_enable_secure)
+- tunestr[off] = '\0';
+- return;
+- }
++ break;
+
+ /* We did not find a valid name-value pair before encountering the
+ colon. */
+@@ -244,9 +240,16 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *valstring)
+ }
+ }
+
+- if (p[len] != '\0')
+- p += len + 1;
++ /* We reached the end while processing the tunable string. */
++ if (p[len] == '\0')
++ break;
++
++ p += len + 1;
+ }
++
++ /* Terminate tunestr before we leave. */
++ if (__libc_enable_secure)
++ tunestr[off] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /* Enable the glibc.malloc.check tunable in SETUID/SETGID programs only when
+diff --git a/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+index 7dfb0e073a..f0b92c97e7 100644
+--- a/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
++++ b/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ const char *teststrings[] =
+ "glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+ "glibc.not_valid.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+ "not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++ "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++ "glibc.malloc.check=2",
+ "glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096:glibc.malloc.check=2",
+ "glibc.malloc.check=4:glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+ ":glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.malloc.check=1",
+@@ -68,6 +70,8 @@ const char *resultstrings[] =
+ "glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+ "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+ "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++ "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++ "",
+ "",
+ "",
+ "",
+@@ -88,11 +88,18 @@ test_child (int off)
+ const char *val = getenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES");
+
+ #if HAVE_TUNABLES
++ printf (" [%d] GLIBC_TUNABLES is %s\n", off, val);
++ fflush (stdout);
+ if (val != NULL && strcmp (val, resultstrings[off]) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (val != NULL)
+- printf ("[%d] Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s\n", off, val);
++ printf (" [%d] Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s, expected %s\n",
++ off, val, resultstrings[off]);
++ else
++ printf (" [%d] GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable absent\n", off);
++
++ fflush (stdout);
+
+ return 1;
+ #else
+@@ -106,21 +117,26 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (ret != 0)
+ exit (1);
+
+- exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
++ /* Special return code to make sure that the child executed all the way
++ through. */
++ exit (42);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+- int ret = 0;
+-
+ /* Spawn tests. */
+ for (int i = 0; i < array_length (teststrings); i++)
+ {
+ char buf[INT_BUFSIZE_BOUND (int)];
+
+- printf ("Spawned test for %s (%d)\n", teststrings[i], i);
++ printf ("[%d] Spawned test for %s\n", i, teststrings[i]);
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%d\n", i);
++ fflush (stdout);
+ if (setenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES", teststrings[i], 1) != 0)
+- exit (1);
++ {
++ printf (" [%d] Failed to set GLIBC_TUNABLES: %m", i);
++ support_record_failure ();
++ continue;
++ }
+
+ int status = support_capture_subprogram_self_sgid (buf);
+
+@@ -128,9 +144,14 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+ if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == EXIT_UNSUPPORTED)
+ return EXIT_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+- ret |= status;
++ if (WEXITSTATUS (status) != 42)
++ {
++ printf (" [%d] child failed with status %d\n", i,
++ WEXITSTATUS (status));
++ support_record_failure ();
++ }
+ }
+- return ret;
++ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
diff --git a/srcpkgs/glibc/template b/srcpkgs/glibc/template
index 452b55c127624..98de6ad7412ed 100644
--- a/srcpkgs/glibc/template
+++ b/srcpkgs/glibc/template
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Template file for 'glibc'
pkgname=glibc
version=2.36
-revision=1
+revision=2
_patchver="72-g0f90d6204d"
bootstrap=yes
short_desc="GNU C library"
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-03 20:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-03 20:20 [PR PATCH] " Johnnynator
2023-10-03 20:22 ` [PR REVIEW] " classabbyamp
2023-10-03 20:31 ` Johnnynator [this message]
2023-10-03 20:32 ` Johnnynator
2023-10-03 20:46 ` [PR PATCH] [Updated] " Johnnynator
2023-10-03 20:47 ` [PR PATCH] [Merged]: " Johnnynator
2023-10-11 9:23 ` [PR REVIEW] " MarijnS95
2023-10-11 9:24 ` MarijnS95
2023-10-11 9:34 ` classabbyamp
2023-10-11 9:35 ` classabbyamp
2023-10-11 11:00 ` MarijnS95
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20231003203127.sPOqyNQa_356lvNtYw_rJXCuiJyhFTjILoFdbP8sWtA@z \
--to=johnnynator@users.noreply.github.com \
--cc=ml@inbox.vuxu.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).