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From: "Daniel Shahaf" <d.s@daniel.shahaf.name>
To: zsh-workers@zsh.org
Cc: "David Wells" <bughunters@tenable.com>
Subject: Re: Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities
Date: Wed, 15 May 2019 10:48:23 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <064219c7-0927-433e-96fc-1e210c7fa276@www.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAH+w=7bLsrFOcsPX491x_jNQmorvG3sYT2WaGtR0RciTTxB6pw@mail.gmail.com>

Bart Schaefer wrote on Tue, 14 May 2019 22:26 +00:00:
> On Tue, May 14, 2019 at 2:39 PM Daniel Shahaf <d.s@daniel.shahaf.name> wrote:
> >
> > I've been trying to come up with counterexamples.  What if somebody
> > installed a /etc/zshenv that does, say, 'disable zmodload enable'?
> 
> You can bypass /etc/zshenv by, for example, invoking zsh as "sh" and
> then running "emulate -R" and/or otherwise futzing with setopts.

I don't think there's an easy solution here, since sourcing /etc/zshenv
in mid-session could be a can of worms, too.

> So either THAT is a security flaw, or your example isn't one either.

I suppose my example was a security flaw _in the sysadmin's setup_.  If someone
wants to make the case that it's a bug in zsh, I'm all ears.

Cheers,

Daniel

  reply	other threads:[~2019-05-15 10:49 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-10 15:03 David Wells
2019-05-10 16:37 ` Bart Schaefer
2019-05-12 16:21   ` Stephane Chazelas
2019-05-13 16:29     ` David Wells
2019-05-13 22:02       ` Bart Schaefer
2019-05-14 18:10       ` Stephane Chazelas
2019-05-14 21:24         ` Daniel Shahaf
2019-05-14 21:38           ` Bart Schaefer
2019-05-14 21:39         ` Daniel Shahaf
2019-05-14 22:25           ` Bart Schaefer
2019-05-15 10:48             ` Daniel Shahaf [this message]
2019-05-31 12:05     ` [PATCH] [doc] [repost] warnings about restricted shell (Was: Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities) Stephane Chazelas
2019-06-03  9:35       ` Peter Stephenson
2019-06-04  2:39       ` dana
2019-06-04  7:34         ` dana
2019-05-10 20:27 ` Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities Bart Schaefer
2019-05-11  1:45   ` #7 (typeset -Tp) (was Re: Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities) Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-13  9:01     ` Peter Stephenson
2019-05-13 21:11   ` PATCH: #6 negative job id (Re: " Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-13 21:44   ` Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-13 22:36   ` #3 typeset and braces (Re: Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities) Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-14  0:13     ` Mikael Magnusson
2019-05-14  5:38       ` Bart Schaefer
2019-05-14 10:50     ` Peter Stephenson
2019-05-14 16:38   ` Zsh - Multiple DoS Vulnerabilities Peter Stephenson
2019-05-14 20:30   ` Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-15 16:50     ` Mikael Magnusson
2019-05-16 20:37     ` Peter Stephenson
2019-05-17 13:41       ` Mikael Magnusson
2019-05-17 13:51         ` Mikael Magnusson
2019-05-17 14:28           ` Mikael Magnusson
2019-05-18 10:31           ` Oliver Kiddle
2019-05-21 14:43             ` Oliver Kiddle
     [not found]               ` <CGME20190521154256eucas1p1f0816d2467abd8bf4a0c31058af2983a@eucas1p1.samsung.com>
2019-05-21 15:42                 ` Peter Stephenson

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