From: Jeremy Mates <jeremy.mates@gmail.com>
To: zsh-workers@zsh.org
Subject: default TMPPREFIX unsafe if local malicious users
Date: Wed, 29 Aug 2012 16:13:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <10BDFE08-7B52-4775-BD19-C5A1B7498202@gmail.com> (raw)
The default TMPPREFIX of /tmp/zsh allows arbitrary file overwrite should a local malicious user have write access to /tmp, for example if the target user uses the Functions/Zle/edit-command-line feature after the following is performed:
for i in {1..99999}; do ln -s /user/file/to/clobber /tmp/zshecl$i; done
This issue could perhaps be avoided by locally setting the NOCLOBBER option for all code that uses TMPPREFIX, or by providing a mktemp(3) interface (if available)?
Jeremy
next reply other threads:[~2012-08-29 23:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-08-29 23:13 Jeremy Mates [this message]
2012-08-30 1:41 ` Sorin Ionescu
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