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From: presotto@plan9.bell-labs.com
To: 9fans@cse.psu.edu
Subject: Re: [9fans] allow
Date: Sun, 16 Jul 2000 18:54:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <200007162254.SAA13583@cse.psu.edu> (raw)

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I'ld tend to agree with this.  Kfs for us is primarily a toy that we
use only on a few standalone systems that we'ld never type allow on.
All of our other systems are 'file system'-less.  Hostowner controls
local resources and, as such, is a superuser for that box.  To a lesser
extent, it can be a superuser to a larger domain since the authentication
server will allow some id's to 'speak for' other id's when connecting
to resources.  I'm currently toying with a complete public key based
system that doesn't even have this speaks for relation so that there
is no super-user.  This arrangement makes a lot of things nicer but
makes somethings more awkward.  For example, I can have a hostagent
running on my terminal that brokers all authentication for my processes,
even ones on cpu servers.  However, when making calls out from a cpu
server, I still have to trust the owner of that cpu server to be running
a system that does what my processes ask it to.  Hence, I'm trusting the
host owner making him a super-user of sorts.  However, the sphere of trust
can be much more arbitrariy and egocentric and I like that.

Cron in such a system becomes much harder.  The cron process has to
possess some of  my private keys in order to do it's job.  I could
limit its ability by certifying scripts that it runs but that's more
work.  However, I think I'm going to bite the bullet and do it.

I'm much enamoured of Mazieres' SFS.  I'ld like to make our authentication
mechanism as easy to use.

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From: arisawa@ar.aichi-u.ac.jp
To: 9fans@cse.psu.edu
Subject: Re: [9fans] allow
Date: Fri, 14 Jul 2000 20:25:46 -0400 (EDT)
Message-ID: <20000714235707.287.qmail@nx.aichi-u.ac.jp>

Hello,

Rob Pike said:
>Better ideas (short of a superuser) are welcome.

and pip@stricca.org:
>Maybe the use of smart cards might be a solution.

I think it is an illusion that we can protect local file system
from someone who can touch keyboard of the machine.
Plan9 has a good solution for the terminals that are shared by
more than one person. That is, "it is best to purge local file  
systems."

On the other hand, There are terminals that are used and managed
by a single person. We need not worry about malicious operations
by the owner. I believe kfs is intended for this case.

UNIX "root" is a formal administrative account. The account worked
well until machines were very expensive. But now every one can have
machines that run UNIX; and then, inconvenience and insecureness are  
left for us.

Plan9 introduced "host owner" instead of "root". Both govern the  
machine. Therefore they are superusers.
I think problem with kfs is in that it does not make distinguish
between "host owner" and others.
"host owner" is, in fact, a special user in terminals and/or  
servers.
Therefore, I think some operations should be limited only to host  
owner.
For example, "disk/kfscmd allow" should allow only to host owner to
ignore access permission.

Kenji Arisawa
E-mail: arisawa@aichi-u.ac.jp

             reply	other threads:[~2000-07-16 22:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2000-07-16 22:54 presotto [this message]
2000-07-17 15:11 ` Douglas A. Gwyn
2000-07-17 21:14   ` arisawa
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-02-07  7:11 tapique
2005-02-07  7:31 ` Lucio De Re
2005-02-07 10:19   ` Heiko Dudzus
2005-02-07 10:57     ` Lucio De Re
2005-02-07  7:32 ` arisawa
2000-07-14 18:51 pip
2000-07-15  0:18 ` Randolph Fritz
2000-07-14 14:18 rob pike
2000-07-15  0:25 ` arisawa
2000-07-15 16:20   ` arisawa

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