* [PR PATCH] libsndfile: update to 1.0.30
@ 2020-09-24 1:34 lun-4
2020-09-25 0:46 ` [PR PATCH] [Merged]: " ahesford
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: lun-4 @ 2020-09-24 1:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ml
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There is a new pull request by lun-4 against master on the void-packages repository
https://github.com/lun-4/void-packages libsndfile-update-2
https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/pull/25064
libsndfile: update to 1.0.30
Followup from #24366 (same reasoning behind patch removal).
Tested on x86_64 glibc (personal projects, `lmms`, and `audacity`).
A patch file from https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/pull/25064.patch is attached
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From 9d3acf45b806ce546a3499cfaa6e907231c4e7fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luna <git@l4.pm>
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2020 22:31:21 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] libsndfile: update to 1.0.30
---
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-12562.patch | 85 --------------
.../CVE-2017-14245_CVE-2017-14246.patch | 108 ------------------
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14634.patch | 33 ------
...-17457_CVE-2018-19661_CVE-2018-19662.patch | 88 --------------
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-6892.patch | 23 ----
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8362.patch | 39 -------
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8363.patch | 67 -----------
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8365.patch | 60 ----------
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-13139.patch | 29 -----
.../libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-19758.patch | 23 ----
srcpkgs/libsndfile/template | 10 +-
11 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 560 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-12562.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14245_CVE-2017-14246.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14634.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-17456_CVE-2017-17457_CVE-2018-19661_CVE-2018-19662.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-6892.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8362.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8363.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8365.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-13139.patch
delete mode 100644 srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-19758.patch
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-12562.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-12562.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 82678f2b030..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-12562.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-commit cf7a8182c2642c50f1cf90dddea9ce96a8bad2e8
-Author: Jörn Heusipp <osmanx@problemloesungsmaschine.de>
-Date: Wed Jun 14 12:25:40 2017 +0200
-
- src/common.c: Fix heap buffer overflows when writing strings in binheader
-
- Fixes the following problems:
- 1. Case 's' only enlarges the buffer by 16 bytes instead of size bytes.
- 2. psf_binheader_writef() enlarges the header buffer (if needed) prior to the
- big switch statement by an amount (16 bytes) which is enough for all cases
- where only a single value gets added. Cases 's', 'S', 'p' however
- additionally write an arbitrary length block of data and again enlarge the
- buffer to the required amount. However, the required space calculation does
- not take into account the size of the length field which gets output before
- the data.
- 3. Buffer size requirement calculation in case 'S' does not account for the
- padding byte ("size += (size & 1) ;" happens after the calculation which
- uses "size").
- 4. Case 'S' can overrun the header buffer by 1 byte when no padding is
- involved
- ("memcpy (&(psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx]), strptr, size + 1) ;" while
- the buffer is only guaranteed to have "size" space available).
- 5. "psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx] = 0 ;" in case 'S' always writes 1 byte
- beyond the space which is guaranteed to be allocated in the header buffer.
- 6. Case 's' can overrun the provided source string by 1 byte if padding is
- involved ("memcpy (&(psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx]), strptr, size) ;"
- where "size" is "strlen (strptr) + 1" (which includes the 0 terminator,
- plus optionally another 1 which is padding and not guaranteed to be
- readable via the source string pointer).
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/292
-
-diff --git src/common.c src/common.c
-index 1a6204ca..6b2a2ee9 100644
---- src/common.c
-+++ src/common.c
-@@ -681,16 +681,16 @@ psf_binheader_writef (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *format, ...)
- /* Write a C string (guaranteed to have a zero terminator). */
- strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
- size = strlen (strptr) + 1 ;
-- size += (size & 1) ;
-
-- if (psf->header.indx + (sf_count_t) size >= psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 16))
-+ if (psf->header.indx + 4 + (sf_count_t) size + (sf_count_t) (size & 1) > psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 4 + size + (size & 1)))
- return count ;
-
- if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
-- header_put_be_int (psf, size) ;
-+ header_put_be_int (psf, size + (size & 1)) ;
- else
-- header_put_le_int (psf, size) ;
-+ header_put_le_int (psf, size + (size & 1)) ;
- memcpy (&(psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx]), strptr, size) ;
-+ size += (size & 1) ;
- psf->header.indx += size ;
- psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx - 1] = 0 ;
- count += 4 + size ;
-@@ -703,16 +703,15 @@ psf_binheader_writef (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *format, ...)
- */
- strptr = va_arg (argptr, char *) ;
- size = strlen (strptr) ;
-- if (psf->header.indx + (sf_count_t) size > psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, size))
-+ if (psf->header.indx + 4 + (sf_count_t) size + (sf_count_t) (size & 1) > psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 4 + size + (size & 1)))
- return count ;
- if (psf->rwf_endian == SF_ENDIAN_BIG)
- header_put_be_int (psf, size) ;
- else
- header_put_le_int (psf, size) ;
-- memcpy (&(psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx]), strptr, size + 1) ;
-+ memcpy (&(psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx]), strptr, size + (size & 1)) ;
- size += (size & 1) ;
- psf->header.indx += size ;
-- psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx] = 0 ;
- count += 4 + size ;
- break ;
-
-@@ -724,7 +723,7 @@ psf_binheader_writef (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const char *format, ...)
- size = (size & 1) ? size : size + 1 ;
- size = (size > 254) ? 254 : size ;
-
-- if (psf->header.indx + (sf_count_t) size > psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, size))
-+ if (psf->header.indx + 1 + (sf_count_t) size > psf->header.len && psf_bump_header_allocation (psf, 1 + size))
- return count ;
-
- header_put_byte (psf, size) ;
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14245_CVE-2017-14246.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14245_CVE-2017-14246.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 12d5ff4217b..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14245_CVE-2017-14246.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-commit 2d54514a4f6437b67829717c05472d2e3300a258
-Author: Fabian Greffrath <fabian@greffrath.com>
-Date: Wed Sep 27 14:46:17 2017 +0200
-
- sfe_copy_data_fp: check value of "max" variable for being normal
-
- and check elements of the data[] array for being finite.
-
- Both checks use functions provided by the <math.h> header as declared
- by the C99 standard.
-
- Fixes #317
- CVE-2017-14245
- CVE-2017-14246
-
-diff --git programs/common.c programs/common.c
-index a21e62ca..a249a585 100644
---- programs/common.c
-+++ programs/common.c
-@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <stdint.h>
-+#include <math.h>
-
- #include <sndfile.h>
-
-@@ -45,7 +46,7 @@
-
- #define MIN(x, y) ((x) < (y) ? (x) : (y))
-
--void
-+int
- sfe_copy_data_fp (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels, int normalize)
- { static double data [BUFFER_LEN], max ;
- sf_count_t frames, readcount, k ;
-@@ -54,6 +55,8 @@ sfe_copy_data_fp (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels, int normalize
- readcount = frames ;
-
- sf_command (infile, SFC_CALC_SIGNAL_MAX, &max, sizeof (max)) ;
-+ if (!isnormal (max)) /* neither zero, subnormal, infinite, nor NaN */
-+ return 1 ;
-
- if (!normalize && max < 1.0)
- { while (readcount > 0)
-@@ -67,12 +70,16 @@ sfe_copy_data_fp (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels, int normalize
- while (readcount > 0)
- { readcount = sf_readf_double (infile, data, frames) ;
- for (k = 0 ; k < readcount * channels ; k++)
-- data [k] /= max ;
-+ { data [k] /= max ;
-+
-+ if (!isfinite (data [k])) /* infinite or NaN */
-+ return 1;
-+ }
- sf_writef_double (outfile, data, readcount) ;
- } ;
- } ;
-
-- return ;
-+ return 0 ;
- } /* sfe_copy_data_fp */
-
- void
-@@ -252,7 +259,12 @@ sfe_apply_metadata_changes (const char * filenames [2], const METADATA_INFO * in
-
- /* If the input file is not the same as the output file, copy the data. */
- if ((infileminor == SF_FORMAT_DOUBLE) || (infileminor == SF_FORMAT_FLOAT))
-- sfe_copy_data_fp (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels, SF_FALSE) ;
-+ { if (sfe_copy_data_fp (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels, SF_FALSE) != 0)
-+ { printf ("Error : Not able to decode input file '%s'\n", filenames [0]) ;
-+ error_code = 1 ;
-+ goto cleanup_exit ;
-+ } ;
-+ }
- else
- sfe_copy_data_int (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels) ;
- } ;
-diff --git programs/common.h programs/common.h
-index eda2d7d7..986277ee 100644
---- programs/common.h
-+++ programs/common.h
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ typedef SF_BROADCAST_INFO_VAR (2048) SF_BROADCAST_INFO_2K ;
-
- void sfe_apply_metadata_changes (const char * filenames [2], const METADATA_INFO * info) ;
-
--void sfe_copy_data_fp (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels, int normalize) ;
-+int sfe_copy_data_fp (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels, int normalize) ;
-
- void sfe_copy_data_int (SNDFILE *outfile, SNDFILE *infile, int channels) ;
-
-diff --git programs/sndfile-convert.c programs/sndfile-convert.c
-index dff7f793..e6de5935 100644
---- programs/sndfile-convert.c
-+++ programs/sndfile-convert.c
-@@ -335,7 +335,11 @@ main (int argc, char * argv [])
- || (outfileminor == SF_FORMAT_DOUBLE) || (outfileminor == SF_FORMAT_FLOAT)
- || (infileminor == SF_FORMAT_DOUBLE) || (infileminor == SF_FORMAT_FLOAT)
- || (infileminor == SF_FORMAT_VORBIS) || (outfileminor == SF_FORMAT_VORBIS))
-- sfe_copy_data_fp (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels, normalize) ;
-+ { if (sfe_copy_data_fp (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels, normalize) != 0)
-+ { printf ("Error : Not able to decode input file %s.\n", infilename) ;
-+ return 1 ;
-+ } ;
-+ }
- else
- sfe_copy_data_int (outfile, infile, sfinfo.channels) ;
-
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14634.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14634.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 80a26594bfb..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-14634.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-commit 85c877d5072866aadbe8ed0c3e0590fbb5e16788
-Author: Fabian Greffrath <fabian@greffrath.com>
-Date: Thu Sep 28 12:15:04 2017 +0200
-
- double64_init: Check psf->sf.channels against upper bound
-
- This prevents division by zero later in the code.
-
- While the trivial case to catch this (i.e. sf.channels < 1) has already
- been covered, a crafted file may report a number of channels that is
- so high (i.e. > INT_MAX/sizeof(double)) that it "somehow" gets
- miscalculated to zero (if this makes sense) in the determination of the
- blockwidth. Since we only support a limited number of channels anyway,
- make sure to check here as well.
-
- CVE-2017-14634
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/318
- Signed-off-by: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-
-diff --git src/double64.c src/double64.c
-index b318ea86..78dfef7f 100644
---- src/double64.c
-+++ src/double64.c
-@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int
- double64_init (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
- { static int double64_caps ;
-
-- if (psf->sf.channels < 1)
-+ if (psf->sf.channels < 1 || psf->sf.channels > SF_MAX_CHANNELS)
- { psf_log_printf (psf, "double64_init : internal error : channels = %d\n", psf->sf.channels) ;
- return SFE_INTERNAL ;
- } ;
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-17456_CVE-2017-17457_CVE-2018-19661_CVE-2018-19662.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-17456_CVE-2017-17457_CVE-2018-19661_CVE-2018-19662.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cf59d33c834..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-17456_CVE-2017-17457_CVE-2018-19661_CVE-2018-19662.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-commit 8ddc442d539ca775d80cdbc7af17a718634a743f
-Author: Hugo Lefeuvre <hle@owl.eu.com>
-Date: Mon Dec 24 06:43:48 2018 +0100
-
- a/ulaw: fix multiple buffer overflows (#432)
-
- i2ulaw_array() and i2alaw_array() fail to handle ptr [count] = INT_MIN
- properly, leading to buffer underflow. INT_MIN is a special value
- since - INT_MIN cannot be represented as int.
-
- In this case round - INT_MIN to INT_MAX and proceed as usual.
-
- f2ulaw_array() and f2alaw_array() fail to handle ptr [count] = NaN
- properly, leading to null pointer dereference.
-
- In this case, arbitrarily set the buffer value to 0.
-
- This commit fixes #429 (CVE-2018-19661 and CVE-2018-19662) and
- fixes #344 (CVE-2017-17456 and CVE-2017-17457).
-
-diff --git src/alaw.c src/alaw.c
-index 063fd1a2..4220224c 100644
---- src/alaw.c
-+++ src/alaw.c
-@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
- #include "sfconfig.h"
-
- #include <math.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-
- #include "sndfile.h"
- #include "common.h"
-@@ -326,7 +327,9 @@ s2alaw_array (const short *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer)
- static inline void
- i2alaw_array (const int *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer)
- { while (--count >= 0)
-- { if (ptr [count] >= 0)
-+ { if (ptr [count] == INT_MIN)
-+ buffer [count] = alaw_encode [INT_MAX >> (16 + 4)] ;
-+ else if (ptr [count] >= 0)
- buffer [count] = alaw_encode [ptr [count] >> (16 + 4)] ;
- else
- buffer [count] = 0x7F & alaw_encode [- ptr [count] >> (16 + 4)] ;
-@@ -346,7 +349,9 @@ f2alaw_array (const float *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer, float normfact
- static inline void
- d2alaw_array (const double *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer, double normfact)
- { while (--count >= 0)
-- { if (ptr [count] >= 0)
-+ { if (!isfinite (ptr [count]))
-+ buffer [count] = 0 ;
-+ else if (ptr [count] >= 0)
- buffer [count] = alaw_encode [lrint (normfact * ptr [count])] ;
- else
- buffer [count] = 0x7F & alaw_encode [- lrint (normfact * ptr [count])] ;
-diff --git src/ulaw.c src/ulaw.c
-index e50b4cb5..b6070ade 100644
---- src/ulaw.c
-+++ src/ulaw.c
-@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
- #include "sfconfig.h"
-
- #include <math.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-
- #include "sndfile.h"
- #include "common.h"
-@@ -827,7 +828,9 @@ s2ulaw_array (const short *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer)
- static inline void
- i2ulaw_array (const int *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer)
- { while (--count >= 0)
-- { if (ptr [count] >= 0)
-+ { if (ptr [count] == INT_MIN)
-+ buffer [count] = ulaw_encode [INT_MAX >> (16 + 2)] ;
-+ else if (ptr [count] >= 0)
- buffer [count] = ulaw_encode [ptr [count] >> (16 + 2)] ;
- else
- buffer [count] = 0x7F & ulaw_encode [-ptr [count] >> (16 + 2)] ;
-@@ -847,7 +850,9 @@ f2ulaw_array (const float *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer, float normfact
- static inline void
- d2ulaw_array (const double *ptr, int count, unsigned char *buffer, double normfact)
- { while (--count >= 0)
-- { if (ptr [count] >= 0)
-+ { if (!isfinite (ptr [count]))
-+ buffer [count] = 0 ;
-+ else if (ptr [count] >= 0)
- buffer [count] = ulaw_encode [lrint (normfact * ptr [count])] ;
- else
- buffer [count] = 0x7F & ulaw_encode [- lrint (normfact * ptr [count])] ;
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-6892.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-6892.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 131145fff6d..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-6892.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-commit f833c53cb596e9e1792949f762e0b33661822748
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Tue May 23 20:15:24 2017 +1000
-
- src/aiff.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
-
- Secunia Advisory SA76717.
-
- Found by: Laurent Delosieres, Secunia Research at Flexera Software
-
-diff --git src/aiff.c src/aiff.c
-index 5b5f9f53..45864b76 100644
---- src/aiff.c
-+++ src/aiff.c
-@@ -1759,7 +1759,7 @@ aiff_read_chanmap (SF_PRIVATE * psf, unsigned dword)
- psf_binheader_readf (psf, "j", dword - bytesread) ;
-
- if (map_info->channel_map != NULL)
-- { size_t chanmap_size = psf->sf.channels * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
-+ { size_t chanmap_size = SF_MIN (psf->sf.channels, layout_tag & 0xffff) * sizeof (psf->channel_map [0]) ;
-
- free (psf->channel_map) ;
-
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8362.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8362.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3f86bf447c0..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8362.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-commit ef1dbb2df1c0e741486646de40bd638a9c4cd808
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Fri Apr 14 15:19:16 2017 +1000
-
- src/flac.c: Fix a buffer read overflow
-
- A file (generated by a fuzzer) which increased the number of channels
- from one frame to the next could cause a read beyond the end of the
- buffer provided by libFLAC. Only option is to abort the read.
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/231
-
-diff --git src/flac.c src/flac.c
-index 5a4f8c21..e4f9aaa0 100644
---- src/flac.c
-+++ src/flac.c
-@@ -169,6 +169,14 @@ flac_buffer_copy (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
- const int32_t* const *buffer = pflac->wbuffer ;
- unsigned i = 0, j, offset, channels, len ;
-
-+ if (psf->sf.channels != (int) frame->header.channels)
-+ { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error: FLAC frame changed from %d to %d channels\n"
-+ "Nothing to do but to error out.\n" ,
-+ psf->sf.channels, frame->header.channels) ;
-+ psf->error = SFE_FLAC_CHANNEL_COUNT_CHANGED ;
-+ return 0 ;
-+ } ;
-+
- /*
- ** frame->header.blocksize is variable and we're using a constant blocksize
- ** of FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE.
-@@ -202,7 +210,6 @@ flac_buffer_copy (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
- return 0 ;
- } ;
-
--
- len = SF_MIN (pflac->len, frame->header.blocksize) ;
-
- if (pflac->remain % channels != 0)
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8363.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8363.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index aef6d87475b..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8363.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-commit cd7da8dbf6ee4310d21d9e44b385d6797160d9e8
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Wed Apr 12 20:19:34 2017 +1000
-
- src/flac.c: Fix another memory leak
-
- When the FLAC decoder was passed a malformed file, the associated
- `FLAC__StreamDecoder` object was not getting released.
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/233
-
-diff --git src/flac.c src/flac.c
-index 986a7b8f..5a4f8c21 100644
---- src/flac.c
-+++ src/flac.c
-@@ -841,7 +841,9 @@ flac_read_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf)
-
- psf_log_printf (psf, "End\n") ;
-
-- if (psf->error == 0)
-+ if (psf->error != 0)
-+ FLAC__stream_decoder_delete (pflac->fsd) ;
-+ else
- { FLAC__uint64 position ;
-
- FLAC__stream_decoder_get_decode_position (pflac->fsd, &position) ;
-
-commit 5206a9b65e61598fde44d276c81b0585bc428562
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Wed Apr 12 19:10:40 2017 +1000
-
- src/flac.c: Fix a memory leak
-
- The pflac->rbuffer pointer array was being allocated in two
- places, but only one of them (the one that was kept) was checking
- to ensure the pointers were NULL before allocation.
-
- Leak was found by fuzzing the sndfile-resample binary compiled
- with ASAN.
-
-diff --git src/flac.c src/flac.c
-index 40629c7d..84de0e26 100644
---- src/flac.c
-+++ src/flac.c
-@@ -430,8 +430,7 @@ sf_flac_meta_get_vorbiscomments (SF_PRIVATE *psf, const FLAC__StreamMetadata *me
- static void
- sf_flac_meta_callback (const FLAC__StreamDecoder * UNUSED (decoder), const FLAC__StreamMetadata *metadata, void *client_data)
- { SF_PRIVATE *psf = (SF_PRIVATE*) client_data ;
-- FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
-- int bitwidth = 0, i ;
-+ int bitwidth = 0 ;
-
- switch (metadata->type)
- { case FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO :
-@@ -468,12 +467,6 @@ sf_flac_meta_callback (const FLAC__StreamDecoder * UNUSED (decoder), const FLAC_
-
- if (bitwidth > 0)
- psf_log_printf (psf, " Bit width : %d\n", bitwidth) ;
--
--
-- for (i = 0 ; i < psf->sf.channels ; i++)
-- pflac->rbuffer [i] = calloc (FLAC__MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, sizeof (int32_t)) ;
--
-- pflac->wbuffer = (const int32_t* const*) pflac->rbuffer ;
- break ;
-
- case FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_VORBIS_COMMENT :
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8365.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8365.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 400147f4863..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2017-8365.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-commit fd0484aba8e51d16af1e3a880f9b8b857b385eb3
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Wed Apr 12 19:45:30 2017 +1000
-
- FLAC: Fix a buffer read overrun
-
- Buffer read overrun occurs when reading a FLAC file that switches
- from 2 channels to one channel mid-stream. Only option is to
- abort the read.
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/230
-
-diff --git src/common.h src/common.h
-index 0bd810c3..e2669b6a 100644
---- src/common.h
-+++ src/common.h
-@@ -725,6 +725,7 @@ enum
- SFE_FLAC_INIT_DECODER,
- SFE_FLAC_LOST_SYNC,
- SFE_FLAC_BAD_SAMPLE_RATE,
-+ SFE_FLAC_CHANNEL_COUNT_CHANGED,
- SFE_FLAC_UNKOWN_ERROR,
-
- SFE_WVE_NOT_WVE,
-diff --git src/flac.c src/flac.c
-index 84de0e26..986a7b8f 100644
---- src/flac.c
-+++ src/flac.c
-@@ -434,6 +434,19 @@ sf_flac_meta_callback (const FLAC__StreamDecoder * UNUSED (decoder), const FLAC_
-
- switch (metadata->type)
- { case FLAC__METADATA_TYPE_STREAMINFO :
-+ if (psf->sf.channels > 0 && psf->sf.channels != (int) metadata->data.stream_info.channels)
-+ { psf_log_printf (psf, "Error: FLAC stream changed from %d to %d channels\n"
-+ "Nothing to be but to error out.\n" ,
-+ psf->sf.channels, metadata->data.stream_info.channels) ;
-+ psf->error = SFE_FLAC_CHANNEL_COUNT_CHANGED ;
-+ return ;
-+ } ;
-+
-+ if (psf->sf.channels > 0 && psf->sf.samplerate != (int) metadata->data.stream_info.sample_rate)
-+ { psf_log_printf (psf, "Warning: FLAC stream changed sample rates from %d to %d.\n"
-+ "Carrying on as if nothing happened.",
-+ psf->sf.samplerate, metadata->data.stream_info.sample_rate) ;
-+ } ;
- psf->sf.channels = metadata->data.stream_info.channels ;
- psf->sf.samplerate = metadata->data.stream_info.sample_rate ;
- psf->sf.frames = metadata->data.stream_info.total_samples ;
-diff --git src/sndfile.c src/sndfile.c
-index 41875610..e2a87be8 100644
---- src/sndfile.c
-+++ src/sndfile.c
-@@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ ErrorStruct SndfileErrors [] =
- { SFE_FLAC_INIT_DECODER , "Error : problem with initialization of the flac decoder." },
- { SFE_FLAC_LOST_SYNC , "Error : flac decoder lost sync." },
- { SFE_FLAC_BAD_SAMPLE_RATE, "Error : flac does not support this sample rate." },
-+ { SFE_FLAC_CHANNEL_COUNT_CHANGED, "Error : flac channel changed mid stream." },
- { SFE_FLAC_UNKOWN_ERROR , "Error : unknown error in flac decoder." },
-
- { SFE_WVE_NOT_WVE , "Error : not a WVE file." },
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-13139.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-13139.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 268082f74d2..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-13139.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-commit aaea680337267bfb6d2544da878890ee7f1c5077
-Author: Brett T. Warden <brett.t.warden@intel.com>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:01:17 2018 -0700
-
- Check MAX_CHANNELS in sndfile-deinterleave
-
- Allocated buffer has space for only 16 channels. Verify that input file
- meets this limit.
-
- Fixes #397
-
-diff --git programs/sndfile-deinterleave.c programs/sndfile-deinterleave.c
-index 53660310..225b4d54 100644
---- programs/sndfile-deinterleave.c
-+++ programs/sndfile-deinterleave.c
-@@ -89,6 +89,13 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
- exit (1) ;
- } ;
-
-+ if (sfinfo.channels > MAX_CHANNELS)
-+ { printf ("\nError : Input file '%s' has too many (%d) channels. Limit is %d.\n",
-+ argv [1], sfinfo.channels, MAX_CHANNELS) ;
-+ exit (1) ;
-+ } ;
-+
-+
- state.channels = sfinfo.channels ;
- sfinfo.channels = 1 ;
-
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-19758.patch b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-19758.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index df33af9b46e..00000000000
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/patches/CVE-2018-19758.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-commit 42132c543358cee9f7c3e9e9b15bb6c1063a608e
-Author: Erik de Castro Lopo <erikd@mega-nerd.com>
-Date: Tue Jan 1 20:11:46 2019 +1100
-
- src/wav.c: Fix heap read overflow
-
- This is CVE-2018-19758.
-
- Closes: https://github.com/erikd/libsndfile/issues/435
-
-diff --git src/wav.c src/wav.c
-index 9d71aadb..5c825f2a 100644
---- src/wav.c
-+++ src/wav.c
-@@ -1146,6 +1146,8 @@ wav_write_header (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int calc_length)
- psf_binheader_writef (psf, "44", BHW4 (0), BHW4 (0)) ; /* SMTPE format */
- psf_binheader_writef (psf, "44", BHW4 (psf->instrument->loop_count), BHW4 (0)) ;
-
-+ /* Loop count is signed 16 bit number so we limit it range to something sensible. */
-+ psf->instrument->loop_count &= 0x7fff ;
- for (tmp = 0 ; tmp < psf->instrument->loop_count ; tmp++)
- { int type ;
-
diff --git a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/template b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/template
index a2bf8dc5b3f..3fd12e6afc0 100644
--- a/srcpkgs/libsndfile/template
+++ b/srcpkgs/libsndfile/template
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
# Template file for 'libsndfile'
pkgname=libsndfile
-version=1.0.28
-revision=3
+version=1.0.30
+revision=1
build_style=gnu-configure
hostmakedepends="pkg-config python"
-makedepends="alsa-lib-devel libvorbis-devel libflac-devel sqlite-devel"
+makedepends="alsa-lib-devel libvorbis-devel libflac-devel sqlite-devel opus-devel"
short_desc="C library for reading and writing files containing sampled sound"
maintainer="Orphaned <orphan@voidlinux.org>"
license="LGPL-2.1-or-later"
homepage="http://www.mega-nerd.com/libsndfile"
-distfiles="http://www.mega-nerd.com/${pkgname}/files/${pkgname}-${version}.tar.gz"
-checksum=1ff33929f042fa333aed1e8923aa628c3ee9e1eb85512686c55092d1e5a9dfa9
+distfiles="https://github.com/erikd/${pkgname}/releases/download/v${version}/${pkgname}-${version}.tar.bz2"
+checksum=ec898634766595438142c76cf3bdd46b77305d4a295dd16b29d024122d7a4b3f
libsndfile-progs_package() {
short_desc+=" - bundled cmdline apps"
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PR PATCH] [Merged]: libsndfile: update to 1.0.30
2020-09-24 1:34 [PR PATCH] libsndfile: update to 1.0.30 lun-4
@ 2020-09-25 0:46 ` ahesford
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: ahesford @ 2020-09-25 0:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ml
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 292 bytes --]
There's a merged pull request on the void-packages repository
libsndfile: update to 1.0.30
https://github.com/void-linux/void-packages/pull/25064
Description:
Followup from #24366 (same reasoning behind patch removal).
Tested on x86_64 glibc (personal projects, `lmms`, and `audacity`).
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
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