From: kemal <kemalinanc8@gmail.com>
To: 9front@9front.org
Subject: Re: [9front] [PATCH] libsec: add minimal support for the tls renegotiation extension
Date: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 17:30:29 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CABO6shfCgoe-k9tLJj_Xf0bztYyh9rCjcF53zXQ9-waZgQu+9w@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFSF3XMkoEyLmoiFDmCxUHJ+qQgkz-w25=YHnV10aSfFJcA_RA@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-25 17:18 GMT, hiro <23hiro@gmail.com>:
> well i know thats not the case. tls 1.3 downgrade attacks are always
> possible atm.
> what i wasnt sure is if downgrades to tls1.1 are still possible in
> practice.
> i was just hoping that maybe one could save some effort and skip a
> version, but i guess not.
> and anyway dragons are lurking in tls1.3, too.
>
yes, you're right, tls1.3 definitely has vulns. it's just that no
downgrade attack is known, but someone may find one :)
downgrading to tls 1.1 wouldn't help, afaik the extension can be
used with 1.0-1.2 so openssl probably checks for the extension
in those versions too.
even if we tried to, the tls 1.3 spec mandates that the highest
supported version must be stated as 1.2, and 1.3 support stated
in a new extension. so i think we can't downgrade the handshake
to 1.1 or 1.0.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-25 17:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-10 2:24 Anthony Martin
2023-01-18 15:07 ` [9front] " Anthony Martin
2023-01-19 4:30 ` [9front] " ori
2023-01-19 4:48 ` ori
2022-11-10 2:24 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-28 21:20 ` ori
2023-01-28 21:59 ` cinap_lenrek
2023-01-19 9:50 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-20 12:12 ` hiro
2023-01-20 21:05 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-20 22:33 ` hiro
2023-01-21 3:48 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-21 12:54 ` hiro
2023-01-21 17:29 ` Steve Simon
2023-01-22 16:00 ` hiro
2023-01-22 7:55 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-22 16:10 ` hiro
2023-01-23 11:18 ` Anthony Martin
2023-01-23 13:16 ` hiro
2023-01-23 14:24 ` Ori Bernstein
2023-01-23 14:29 ` Ori Bernstein
2023-01-24 0:14 ` hiro
2023-01-24 0:16 ` hiro
2023-01-25 16:19 ` kemal
2023-01-25 16:39 ` hiro
2023-01-25 17:07 ` kemal
2023-01-25 17:18 ` hiro
2023-01-25 17:30 ` kemal [this message]
2023-01-25 17:36 ` kemal
2023-01-26 20:54 ` hiro
2023-01-26 21:52 ` Frank D. Engel, Jr.
2023-01-27 6:11 ` kemal
2023-01-27 10:55 ` hiro
2023-01-27 17:38 ` kemal
2023-01-23 16:23 ` hiro
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