From: ron@ronnatalie.com (Ron Natalie)
Subject: [TUHS] OT: critical Intel design flaw
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 06:57:20 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0b2201d3848a$02ba8d90$082fa8b0$@ronnatalie.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALMnNGh7FJ7LYgna1LKJUSW9+bE5O7cSEK8PViqqogwe08V8ow@mail.gmail.com>
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I think it’s much ado about nothing. In fact, nearly the same bug cropped up in the 386 and we had to hack around it in UNIX then (in the 32 bit pentiums you can use one of the segment registers to provide a second layer of security over paging. Alas, this doesn’t work on the 64 bit addressing mode).
From: TUHS [mailto:tuhs-bounces@minnie.tuhs.org] On Behalf Of Andy Kosela
Sent: Wednesday, January 3, 2018 2:54 AM
To: The Eunuchs Hysterical Society
Subject: [TUHS] OT: critical Intel design flaw
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/01/02/intel_cpu_design_flaw/
Including here as it concerns Unix kernel and leaking memory from kernel space to userland.
This is big -- it appears this is a fundamental Intel bug that exists in all x86_64 CPUs.
It will be interesting to watch the ramifications and impact of this on the industry as a whole.
--Andy
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-03 11:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-03 7:53 Andy Kosela
2018-01-03 11:57 ` Ron Natalie [this message]
2018-01-03 14:22 ` Random832
2018-01-03 13:43 Noel Chiappa
2018-01-03 14:26 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 17:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 17:46 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 18:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 18:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 18:39 ` Forrest, Jon
2018-01-03 18:50 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 19:56 ` Paul Winalski
2018-01-03 20:24 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 23:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 0:51 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 2:13 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:26 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 3:31 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:09 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 3:21 ` Dan Cross
2018-01-04 17:42 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 11:53 ` Harald Arnesen
2018-01-04 14:03 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 15:54 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 16:45 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 17:10 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-04 17:17 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 18:29 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 18:50 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 20:52 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 21:16 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 22:55 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-05 14:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 21:17 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 17:20 ` Tom Ivar Helbekkmo
2018-01-04 17:28 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-03 17:07 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 17:06 Norman Wilson
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