From: random832@fastmail.com (Random832)
Subject: [TUHS] OT: critical Intel design flaw
Date: Wed, 03 Jan 2018 09:22:23 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1514989343.884423.1222903600.4579DCEA@webmail.messagingengine.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0b2201d3848a$02ba8d90$082fa8b0$@ronnatalie.com>
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 591 bytes --]
On Wed, Jan 3, 2018, at 06:57, Ron Natalie wrote:
> I think it’s much ado about nothing. In fact, nearly the same bug
> cropped up in the 386 and we had to hack around it in UNIX then (in the
> 32 bit pentiums you can use one of the segment registers to provide a
> second layer of security over paging. Alas, this doesn’t work on the
> 64 bit addressing mode).
To my understanding, what's leaking is the addresses (and possibly physical addresses), which are in turn usable in a "rowhammer"-style attack - something that didn't exist (or wasn't known, anyway) in the 386 era.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-03 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-03 7:53 Andy Kosela
2018-01-03 11:57 ` Ron Natalie
2018-01-03 14:22 ` Random832 [this message]
2018-01-03 13:43 Noel Chiappa
2018-01-03 14:26 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 17:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 17:46 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 18:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 18:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 18:39 ` Forrest, Jon
2018-01-03 18:50 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 19:56 ` Paul Winalski
2018-01-03 20:24 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 23:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 0:51 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 2:13 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:26 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 3:31 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:09 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 3:21 ` Dan Cross
2018-01-04 17:42 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 11:53 ` Harald Arnesen
2018-01-04 14:03 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 15:54 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 16:45 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 17:10 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-04 17:17 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 18:29 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 18:50 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 20:52 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 21:16 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 22:55 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-05 14:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 21:17 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 17:20 ` Tom Ivar Helbekkmo
2018-01-04 17:28 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-03 17:07 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 17:06 Norman Wilson
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1514989343.884423.1222903600.4579DCEA@webmail.messagingengine.com \
--to=random832@fastmail.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).