From: jnc@mercury.lcs.mit.edu (Noel Chiappa)
Subject: [TUHS] OT: critical Intel design flaw
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 08:43:58 -0500 (EST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180103134358.3F16818C098@mercury.lcs.mit.edu> (raw)
> From: Andy Kosela
> it appears this is a fundamental Intel bug that exists in all x86_64
> CPUs.
I'm highly amused by the irony. Intel throws bazillions of transistors at
these hyper-complex CPUs in an attempt to make them as fast as possible - and
(probably because of the complexity) missed a bug, the fix for which
involves... slowing things way down!
I wonder how many other bugs are lurking in these hyper-complex designs?
Didn't anyone at Intel stop to think that complexity is bad, in and of itself?
But I guess the market demands for faster and faster machines outweighed that
- until it bit them in the posterior. The real question is 'how many more times
will it have to happen before they get a clue'?
There's an interesting parallel between this, and uSloth's struggle with
security and bugs. For a long time, it seemed it was more important to the
market to add features (i.e. complexity), and security be damned - until poor
security really started to become an issue.
So now they're trying to catch up - but seemingly still haven't got there, in
terms of the fundamental architecture of the OS, as the never-ending stream of
bug patches attests.
The sad thing is that how to provide good security (not perfect, but much,
much better than what we have) was worked out a long time ago, and Intel hired
Roger Schell to add the necessary hardware underpinnings when they did the
386:
http://conservancy.umn.edu/bitstream/11299/133439/1/oh405rrs.pdf
Mutatis mutandis.
Noel
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-03 13:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-03 13:43 Noel Chiappa [this message]
2018-01-03 14:26 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 17:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 17:46 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 18:28 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 18:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-03 18:39 ` Forrest, Jon
2018-01-03 18:50 ` ron minnich
2018-01-03 19:56 ` Paul Winalski
2018-01-03 20:24 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-03 23:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 0:51 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 2:13 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:26 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 3:31 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 2:09 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 3:21 ` Dan Cross
2018-01-04 17:42 ` Arthur Krewat
2018-01-04 11:53 ` Harald Arnesen
2018-01-04 14:03 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 15:54 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 16:45 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 17:10 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-04 17:17 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 18:29 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 18:50 ` Larry McVoy
2018-01-04 20:52 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Theodore Ts'o
2018-01-04 21:16 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-04 22:55 ` Andy Kosela
2018-01-05 14:27 ` Clem Cole
2018-01-04 21:17 ` Bakul Shah
2018-01-04 17:20 ` Tom Ivar Helbekkmo
2018-01-04 17:28 ` Warner Losh
2018-01-03 17:07 ` Bakul Shah
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-03 17:06 Norman Wilson
2018-01-03 7:53 Andy Kosela
2018-01-03 11:57 ` Ron Natalie
2018-01-03 14:22 ` Random832
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